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THE IMPACT ON WOMEN ON THE REMOVAL OF GENDER AS A RATING 
VARIABLE IN MOTOR-VEHICLE INSURANCE 
 
AN Wagener
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
It is common insurance business practice that South African motor-vehicle insurers 
use gender as a rating variable to classify risks into certain classes and to determine 
insurance premiums.
1 Whether the insured is male or female could have a significant 
impact on the cost of his or her premium. Men pay higher motor-vehicle insurance 
premiums as they are considered as a higher risk group. Women drivers can pay up 
to 40  per cent  less  than men  on motor-vehicle insurance premiums as they   are 
considered a lower risk.
2 Statistics show that women are involved in up to 20 per 
cent fewer motor-vehicle accidents than men and, when a woman is involved in a 
motor-vehicle accident her average repair cost is up to 35 per cent less  than the 
average man’s repair cost. It has also been  found that women take fewer risks, 
make more careful decisions, and are more likely than men to abide by the speed 
limit while driving.
3 
 
The use of gender as a rating variable is not exclusive to the South African insurance 
industry  but  is  widely  used  in  overseas  insurance  markets.  However,  a  recent 
European Court of Justice decision has ruled that the coun tries of the  European 
Union are be prohibited from using gender as an insurance -rating variable as from 
12 December 2012.
4 This decision has reminded South African insurers that their 
                                                           
   Anthea Natalie Wagener. LLB (UP) LLM (Unisa). Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, Unisa, 
South  Africa.  Email:  Wagenan@unisa.ac.za.  This  article  is  partly  based  on  the  author's 
unpublished masters’ dissertation entitled "The Use of Age and Gender as Rating Variables in 
Motor-Vehicle Insurance" (Unisa Pretoria 2011). 
1   Classification of risk is not limited to gender but other rating variables will not be discussed for 
the purposes of this article. They include but are not limited to age, geographical location, and 
years licensed. 
2   First for Women Date unknown http://bit.ly/16pBB9l. 
3   First for Women Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZuTqh2. 
4   ECJ 2011 http://bit.ly/X5Ot1G. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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discriminatory insurance practices may also be subject to change if this matter is 
brought before a South African Court.
5 
 
A South African Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide on whether or not 
the use of gender as a rating variable amounts to unfair discrimination. The purpose 
of this article is to specifically examine the impact that the removal of gender as a 
rating variable in motor-vehicle insurance would have on women, and whether the 
effects thereof would influence a South African Court’s decision in determining if the 
use  of  gender  as  a  rating  variable  amounts  to  unfair  discrimination.  This  article 
examines the findings of American and Canadian Courts in determining this same 
issue,  and  after  considering  South  African  equality  legislation  provides 
recommendations for a South African Court.  
 
2  Analysis of American case law 
 
The American cases discussed have been selected because they aptly illustrate the 
issue of unfair discrimination that arise from the use of gender as a rating variable in 
the  insurance  industry.  The  decisions  vary  from  decisions  of  the  United  States 
Supreme Court to decisions of various lower courts. 
 
Conflicting approaches exist in American case law in considering if the use of gender 
as a rating variable amounts to unfair discrimination. The most considerable impact 
that arose from the cases was the negative effect of the increased cost of motor-
vehicle insurance premiums for women. Cases which required the removal of gender 
as a rating variable will be discussed first, and thereafter there will be a discussion of 
the cases which allowed gender as a rating variable. 
 
                                                           
5   Vivian 2011 Cover Magazine 36; Fourie 2011 Cover Magazine 40. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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2.1  American case law which found in favour of the removal of gender 
as a rating variable in motor-vehicle insurance 
 
In  Hartford  Accident  and  Indemnity  Company  v  Insurance  Commissioner  of  the 
Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,
6  and  Pennsylvania  National  Organisation  for 
Women v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Insurance Department
7 found in favour of 
the removal of gender as a rating variable in motor -vehicle insurance, despite the 
impact that it would have on women.
8 
 
In Hartford the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had to interpret section 3(d) of the 
Casualty and Surety Rate Regulation Act
9 ("the Rate Act"), and decide whether or 
not the conduct of the insurer constituted unfair discrimination when it required 
Philip V Mattes, a twenty-six year old unmarried male with an unblemished driving 
record, to pay more in annual motor-vehicle insurance premiums for identical cover 
than a similarly situated female.
10 Section 3(d) of the Rate Act provided that "rates 
shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly  discriminatory", a matter where the 
motor-vehicle  insurer  required  a  twenty -six  year  old  unmarried  male  with  an 
unblemished  driving  record  to  pay  more  (in  annual  motor -vehicle  insurance 
premiums,  for identical cover)  than a similarly situated female.  The  Act did not 
provide any definition of the phrase "unfair discrimination". Upon giving the Rate Act 
a wide interpretation, the Court found that the insurer’s use of gender-based rating 
constituted unfair discrimination. Although the Court was fully aware of the effect of 
the removal of gender as a rating variable, it found it appropriate to look beyond 
                                                           
6   Hartford  Accident  and  Indemnity  Company  v  Insurance  Commissioner  of  the  Commonwealth 
Pennsylvania 482 A 2d 542 (SC Pa, 1984) (hereafter “Hartford”).  
7   Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Insurance 
Department 551 A 2d 1162 (Pa Cmwlth, 1988)  (hereafter “Pennsylvania National Organisation 
for Women”). 
8   In both City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v Manhart 98 S Ct 1370 (1978) and 
Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v 
Norris  103  S  Ct  3492   (1983),  the  Courts  disallowed  the  use  of  gender  as  a  variable  for 
employees’ pension calculations. These judgments are limited to the employment context and 
will not be discussed for the purposes of this article.  
9   Casualty and Surety Rate Regulation Act, 1947. 
10   Hartford 543-544, paras I-II.  AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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actuarial statistics and give effect to the Rate Act to ensure equality of rights under 
the law. 
 
In  Pennsylvania  National  Organisation  for  Women,  the  Pennsylvania  National 
Organization for Women ("NOW") appealed against the decision of the Insurance 
Commissioner,  who  had  found  it  permissible  to  implement  uniform  motor-vehicle 
insurance rates for both men and women. NOW alleged that women should pay 
lower insurance premiums than men. This was based on the fact that, on average, 
women  drive  shorter  distances  than  men  and  were  therefore  less  likely  to  have 
motor-vehicle accidents. Further, NOW suggested that the gender-neutral approach 
towards rate-making violated the Equal Rights Amendment,
11 as women would in 
effect be subsidising men’s rates. NOW provided evidence that rate structures had to 
be based on mileage, and that insurance companies’ failure to do so gave rise to 
discriminatory  insurance  practices.
12  NOW  concluded  that  the  finding  of  the 
Commissioner, being that there was no direct link between risk of loss and mileage, 
was contradicted by the weight of their evidence.  
 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found that the Commissioner’s decision to 
implement the use of a flat insurance rate for men and women did not violate the 
Equal Rights Amendment,
13 as insurers had established that there was no direct link 
between mileage and insurance costs.
14 The Court held  that despite gender-based 
rating resulting in women having to bear more than their share of the risk, there was 
no  violation  of  the  Equal  Rights  Amendment   as  its  purpose  was  to  eliminate 
distinctions based on gender.
15  
 
It is clear that the C ourts in  Hartford and Pennsylvania National Organisation for 
Women did not approve of the use of gender as a rating variable.  The outcome of 
Hartford and Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women has a negative financial 
                                                           
11   Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Article I, section 28. Commonly referred to 
as the Equal Rights Amendment Pa Const Art I, §28. 
12   Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women 1164. 
13   Equal Rights Amendment Pa Const Art I, §28. 
14   Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women 1167. 
15   Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women 1167. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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impact on women. Women will pay higher motor-vehicle insurance premiums than 
men,  in  order  to  subsidise  the  increased  risk  that  men  pose.  As  a  result  of  the 
increased financial burden on women, there could be a redistribution of wealth from 
women to men. It is argued that this could not have been the intention of the Equal 
Rights Amendment.
16 The intention of the latter was not to impose different benefits 
or burdens upon anyone based solely on their  gender. The minority judgment of 
Hartford warned that this would translate into excessive rates for young women and 
inadequate rates for young men.  When one considers the increased burden placed 
on women by their having to subsidise men’s motor-vehicle insurance premiums, the 
question  that  arises  is  whether  or  not  these  judgments  result  in  reverse 
discrimination, which could be seen as just another form of unfair discrimination.
17  
 
Further, it is argued that the Court in  Hartford erred, as discrimination in terms of 
insurance rates should have been considered from an economic viewpoint. From this 
perspective no injustice exists when a price is increased  in line with an increase in 
product cost. For example, the further  away that a purchased product is from the 
place of delivery, the higher the delivery cost. Likewise, two similar products can 
also differ in price due to product characteristics. It is argued that insurance is also 
an economic product and should be treated as such, and that Hartford failed to view 
insurance in its proper economic context.
18 
 
2.2  American case law which did not find in favour of the removal of 
gender as a rating variable in motor-vehicle insurance 
 
In Insurance Services Office v Commissioner of Insurance
19 and in State of Florida, 
Department of Insurance v Insurance Services Office ,
20 the Courts disapproved of 
the removal of gender as a rating variable in motor-vehicle insurance. 
                                                           
16   Miller 1984-1985 Duq L Rev 627. 
17   Kimball 1979 Am Bar Found Res J 103. 
18   Miller 1984-1985 Duq L Rev 624-626.  
19   Insurance Services Office v Commissioner of Insurance   381 So 2d 515 (La Ct App, 1979) 
(hereafter “Insurance Services Office”). 
20   State of Florida, Department of Insurance v Insurance Services Office  434 So 2d 908 (Fla App 
Dist, 1983) 913-914 (hereafter “State of Florida, Department of Insurance”).  AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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In  Insurance  Services  Office,  the  Commissioner  of  Insurance  of  the  State  of 
Louisiana sought an order against all insurers in the state to refrain from using both 
age and gender as rating variables in motor-vehicle insurance as it considered it to 
amount to unfair discrimination. The Court held that the use of age and gender was 
reasonable, as a sound statistical basis existed to substantiate their use. The Court 
found that if age and gender were disallowed, this would result in women and all 
other insureds over the age of 24 years, who constitute 75 per cent of all drivers, 
paying a higher premium. Those under the age of 25 years would pay substantially 
less. The Court held that this also amounted to reverse discrimination as older and 
more experienced drivers would have to subsidise younger drivers.
21   
 
State of Florida, Department of Insurance similarly involved an appeal against a rule 
that  was  to  prohibit,  inter  alia,  gender  as  a  rating  variable  for  motor -vehicle 
insurance.  The Court rejected an argum ent that the use of gender as  a  rating 
variable is socially unacceptable and found that the use thereof would be unfair only 
if it were found to be actuarially unsound. As evidence shows that the use of gender 
is actuarially sound, the Court disapproved of  the removal thereof. The Court also 
rejected an economic impact statement prepared by the Department of Insurance as 
it did not reflect the estimated cost consequences of the removal of gender as a 
rating variable.  
 
2.3  American case law: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, it appears that the removal gender as an insurance rating variable 
would  have  a  considerable  impact  on  women,  as  indicated  in  Insurance  Service 
Office  and  State  of  Florida,  Department  of  Insurance.  However,  Hartford  and 
Pennsylvania National Organisation for Women did not consider or find it necessary 
to consider all the possible implications of their judgments. They were all aware that 
the result of their judgments would be that if they were to remove age and gender 
                                                           
21   Insurance Services Office 527. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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as rating variables the higher risk group would ultimately subsidise the lower risk 
group. Although this was the most obvious consequence of their judgments, that did 
not affect their decisions. They ultimately considered equal treatment to be a priority 
and did not find the financial repercussions to carry enough weight to necessitate a 
different approach. 
 
3  Analysis of Canadian case law 
 
The Canadian cases discussed were selected because they also aptly illustrate the 
issue of unfair discrimination that arises from the use of gender as a rating variable 
in the insurance industry.  In both  Zurich Insurance Co v Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission)
22  and  Co-operators General Insurance Co v Alberta (Human Rights 
Commission)
23 the Courts disapproved of the removal of gender as a rating variable 
in motor-vehicle insurance. 
 
In Zurich the insured lodged a complaint with the Board of Enquiry that the insurer 
discriminated against him on  the bases of age, sex and marital status. The insurer 
required the insured, a single, 20 -year-old male, to pay  a higher monthly motor-
vehicle insurance premium based on his age, sex and marital status than that of 
young single female drivers, young married male drivers and any other drivers above 
25 years of age.
24 The Supreme Court of Canada had to determine whether or not in 
terms  of  the  Human  Rights  Code,
25  the  insurer’s  differentiation  was  based  on 
"reasonable  and  bona  fide  grounds".
26  The  C ourt  found  that  disallowing 
discriminatory rating variables would have the result that high-risk drivers would be 
pooled  together  with  lower -risk  drivers.  The  Court  held  that  it  would  be  
unreasonable to pool such classes together without available statistics to justify such 
a classification, and found individualised assessment of each insured to be wholly 
                                                           
22   Zurich Insurance Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission) 1992 93 DLR (4th) 346 (SC Can) 
(hereafter “Zurich”). 
23   Co-operators General Insurance Co v Alberta (Human Right s Commission) 1993 107 DLR (4th) 
298 (Alta CA) (hereafter “Co-operators”). 
24   Zurich 349 para a-b.     
25   Human Rights Code, 1981. 
26   Zurich 376 para h.   AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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impractical. The Court found the insurer’s use of the discriminatory rating variables 
to be justifiable. 
 
In Co-operators the Court accepted actuarial evidence that showed that the removal 
of gender as a rating variable would substantially increase the cost of motor-vehicle 
insurance  for  young  female  drivers.  The  removal  of  gender  as  a  rating  variable 
would also provide cheaper premiums for young male drivers, who were high-risk 
drivers. Actuarial evidence also showed that gender becomes less important as a 
rating variable once an insured is approximately 25 years of age. The Court found 
that the removal of gender as a rating variable would have  a greater impact on 
young female drivers than on other interested groups. This finding led the Court to 
find that the removal of gender as a rating variable would have an unfair outcome 
and  to  disapprove  of  the  removal  thereof  as  a  rating  variable  in  motor-vehicle 
insurance.
27 
 
3.1  Canadian case law: Conclusion 
 
In  conclusion,  both  Zurich  and  Co-Operators  did  not  find  the  need  to  remove 
offending  rating  variables  in  motor-vehicle  insurance  to  outweigh  the  significant 
impact that it would have on women. The Courts did not approve that women would 
have to cross-subsidise men and carry the increased cost, despite their being the 
lower-risk group. The Courts ultimately considered the avoidance of the negative 
financial repercussions that it would have on women a priority, and did not find the 
right to equal treatment to carry enough weight to necessitate a different approach. 
 
However,  a  development  in  Canadian  case  law  has  occurred  that  could  possibly 
influence case law that is similar to the decisions of Zurich and Co-operators in the 
future. 
 
                                                           
27   Co-operators 318-321. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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3.2  Developments in Canadian case law subsequent to Zurich and Co-
operators  
 
The developments in Canadian Case law that followed Zurich and Co-operators were 
British  Columbia  (Public  Service  Employee  Relations  Commission)  v  BCGSEU
28 
(hereafter  "Meiorin")  and  British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v 
British Columbia (Council of Human Rights) (hereafter "Grismer").  
 
In Meiorin
29 the Supreme Court of Canada established a test (hereafter the "Meiorin 
test") to determine  if  discrimination is justifiable.
30  Although  Meiorin  dealt with 
discrimination  in  the  employment  context,  this  case  is  applicable  to  i nsurance 
matters which involve possible unfair discrimination ,  as the Court noted that the 
Meiorin test is appropriate for interpreting all discrimination matters in Canada.
31 
 
The Meiorin test is a three-step test that requires the employer to establish, o n a 
balance of probabilities, that: 
 
a)  the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the 
performance of the job; 
b)  the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest  and  good-faith 
belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related 
purpose; and 
                                                           
28   British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU 1999 3 SCR 3; 127 
DLR (4th) 1 (SC Can) (hereafter “Meiorin”). 
29   Meiorin involved a female fire fighter, Tawny Meiorin, who was discriminated against as she 
could not pass a compulsory fitness test for fire fighters imposed by her employer.  The fitness 
test was more appropriate for testing the fitness level of males than of females. 
30   In hearing cases of discrimination before  Meiorin, Canadian Courts tried to determine whether 
the discrimination was direct or indirect.  This is termed a bifurcated approach. I n Meiorin, the 
Supreme Court broke away from the bifurcated approach to employment discrimination, by 
erasing the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination regarding employer defences. 
The Supreme Court replaced the bifurcated approach to disc rimination by introducing a unified 
test applicable to matters concerning both direct and indirect discrimination. The  Meiorin test 
removed the distinction of having separate tests for each type of discrimination. See  Meiorin 11-
13. 
31   Meiorin 13 para 25. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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c)  the  standard  was  reasonably  necessary  to  the  accomplishment  of  that 
legitimate work-related purpose; to show that the standard was reasonably 
necessary,  it  must  demonstrate  that  it  was  impossible  to  accommodate 
individual  employees  sharing  the  characteristics  of  the  claimant,  without 
imposing undue hardship on the employer.
32  
 
The Court elaborated on the third step in the test  to include a number of questions 
which could be raised in the course of its analysis: 
 
a)  Has  the  employer  investigated  alternative  approaches  that  do  not  have  a 
discriminatory  effect,  such  as  individual  testing,  against  a  more  individually 
sensitive standard? 
b)  If alternative standards were investigated and found to be capable of fulfilling the 
employer’s purpose, why were they not implemented? 
c)  Is it necessary for all employees to meet the single standard, in order for the 
employer  to  accomplish  its  legitimate  purpose,  or  could  standards  reflecting 
group or individual differences and capabilities be established? 
d)  Is there a way to do the job that is less discriminatory while still accomplishing 
the employer’s legitimate purpose? 
e)  Is the standard properly designed to ensure that the desired qualification is met 
without placing an undue burden on those to whom the standard applies? 
f)  Have  other  parties  who  are  obliged  to  assist  in  the  search  for  possible 
accommodation fulfilled their roles?
33 
 
The  Meiorin  test  incorporates  the  duty  to  accommodate  the  individual  on  an 
individual  basis  by  seeking  practical   alternatives  (as  the  above  questions 
demonstrate), rather than to view the individual as a member of a group.
34 In this 
regard,  Meiorin  is  relevant  to  insurance  discrimination,  as  it  is  in  the  nature  of 
                                                           
32   Meiorin 24-25 para 54. 
33   Meiorin para 65. 
34   Seiner 2006 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 127. See also Braun 2005-2006 Rev Const Stud 123-124; Pothier 
1999 Constitutional Forum 20-21. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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insurance to divide individuals into groups for the purposes of risk assessment and 
the calculation of premiums. 
 
The  decision  of  Grismer  followed  shortly  after  the  Meiorin  judgment,  and  the 
Supreme Court of Canada again applied the Meiorin test. Grismer involved a matter 
of discrimination on the grounds of disability and the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the Meiorin test applies to all claims of discrimination under the British Columbia 
Human  Rights  Code.
35  Further,  Grismer  defined  "accommodation"  as referring to 
what is required under the circumstances to avo id discrimination.
36  Grismer  also 
found that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the standard 
incorporated every possible accommodation up to the point of undue hardship.  The 
hardship could take the form of increased cost, and it would have to be regarded as 
undue before being accepted as a defence. The fact that such hardship would not be 
an acceptable defence could be particularly relevant as a guideline to insurers  who 
wish to ascertain to what lengths they need to go to accommodate the insured. 
 
Upon considering the Meiorin test in the insurance context, the first and second step 
of the test would perhaps not pose a problem for insurers.  
 
The first step requires a rational connection between the standard and its purpose 
and is aimed at determining the validity of the standard’s general purpose. This step 
would require the insurer to show a rational connection between the provision of 
premiums commensurate with the risk and the use of discriminatory rating variables, 
and this should be easy to prove.
37  
 
The second step  of the test incorporates a subjective element to determine the 
intention of the employer. This step of the test should also not be a concern for the 
insurer as it would have to show that the discriminatory rating variables we re 
                                                           
35   British  Columbia  (Superintendent  of  Motor  Vehicles)  v  British  Columbia  (Council  of  Human 
Rights) 1999 3 SCR 868; 1999 181 DLR (4th) 385 (SC Can) 393 para 19 (hereafter “Grismer”). 
36   Grismer 394 paras 22, 32. 
37   Lemmens and Thiery "Insurance and Human Rights" 283-284. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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adopted honestly and in good faith in order to determine risk. However, the third 
step of the test could present a challenge for insurers. 
 
The third step of the test requires that the standard is reasonably necessary. This 
could be a challenge for insurers to prove, as this step requires justification of the 
use of gender as a rating variable and also imposes the duty of accommodation on 
the insurer.
38  
 
The insurer would have to justify the use of gender as  a rating variable in motor-
vehicle insurance by showing it to be reasonable and necessary. Evidence would 
have  to  be  obtained  by  the  insurer  to  show,  firstly,  the  need  for  gender 
discrimination  and,  secondly,  the  impossibility  of  using  a  less  discriminatory 
alternative.
39 
 
Evidence would also have to s how that the duty to accommodate the insured was 
fulfilled by the insurer, as it had made every possible accommodation short of undue 
hardship. The duty to accommodate would place an obligation on the insurer to 
individually assess the insured to determine his or her individual risk, in contrast to 
simply  viewing  the  insured  as  a  member  of  a  group.  As  held  in  Grismer, 
accommodation  by  the  insurer  short  of  undue   hardship  can  take  the  form  of 
increased cost, and it would have to be regarded as undue before being accepted as 
a  defence.  It  would  be  considered  as  undue  when  it  can  be  proved  that  the 
increased cost would have a serious impact on the financial viability of the insurer 
and the availability of its insurance products.
40  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Meiorin test places a large evidentiary burden on 
the insurer, and reasons given such as in Zurich that individual assessment of each 
insured is wholly impractical would appear no longer to carry any weight in terms of 
the Meiorin test. The insurer’s duty to accommodate the insured up to the point of 
                                                           
38   Lemmens and Thiery "Insurance and Human Rights" 278. See also Sheppard 2001 McGill L J 
539-541. 
39   Lemmens and Thiery "Insurance and Human Rights" 283. 
40   Lemmens and Thiery "Insurance and Human Rights" 285. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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undue  hardship  could  require  the  insurer  to  assess  an  insured  individually  to 
determine the risk that the particular insured poses. This assessment would exclude 
the use of discriminatory rating variables and compel insurers to make use of rating 
variables such as the accident record and mileage instead. The result of individual 
risk assessment may be that each insured would be accurately classified according 
to the risk pool to which he or she belongs. The insured would then be required to 
pay  a  premium  that  reflected  his  or  her  individual  risk.  The  result  that  such  an 
individual risk assessment could have on the insured is that, depending on the risk, 
the insured could either pay more, less, or the same premium that he or she would 
have paid if he or she had been assessed by making use of discriminatory rating 
variables. 
 
4  Analysis of South African law 
 
Upon a South African Court having to decide a matter concerning the removal of 
gender  as  a  rating  variable  section,  the  Court  would  have  to  apply  the  test  for 
equality  set  out  in  sections  14(2)  and  14(3)  of  the  Promotion  of  Equality  and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
41 ("the Equality Act"). The test specifically 
sets out to determine if the present discrimination is unfair. 
 
Section 14(2) of the  Equality Act requires that a number of factors must be taken 
into account in determining whether or not the respondent has proved that the 
discrimination is fair. The factors that have to be considered are (a) the context; (b) 
the factors referred to in section 14(3); and (c) whether or not the discrimination 
reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons according to objectively 
determinable criteria that are inherent in the activity concerned.  
 
Section 14(2)(b) requires that the list of nine criteria to determine whether or not 
the respondent has proved that the discrimination is fair, which  list is set out in 
                                                           
41   Promotion  of  Equality  and  Prevention  of  Unfair  Discrimination  Act  4  of  2000  (herafter  the 
“Equality Act”. AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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section 14(3), has to be considered by a Court. The list, which is not exhaustive, 
includes the following: 
 
a)  whether the discrimination impairs or is likely to impair human dignity; 
b)  the impact or likely impact of the discrimination on the complainant; 
c)  the position of the complainant in society and whether he or she suffers from 
patterns of disadvantage or belongs to a group that suffers from such patterns of 
disadvantage; 
d)  the nature and extent of the discrimination; 
e)  whether the discrimination is systemic in nature; 
f)  whether the discrimination has a legitimate purpose; 
g)  whether and to what extent the discrimination achieves its purpose; 
h)  whether there are less restrictive and less disadvantageous means to achieve the 
purpose; 
i)  whether and to what extent the respondent has taken such steps as being 
reasonable in the circumstances to – 
ii)  address the disadvantage which arises from or is related to one or more of 
the prohibited grounds; or 
iii)  accommodate diversity. 
 
An influential factor in a South African Court’s decision in determining if the use of 
gender  as  a  rating  variable  amounts  to  unfair  discrimination  would  be  section 
14(3)(c).  Historically  South  African  women  have  suffered  from  patterns  of 
disadvantage and are viewed as being more vulnerable in the South African context. 
On the other hand, it is predictable that insurers would place great emphasis on 
section  14(3)(f)  to  prove  that  discrimination  based  on  gender  has  a  legitimate 
purpose.
42 
 
Further, Item 5 of  the  Schedule to the  Equality Act  identifies three illustrative 
practices in the insurance industry which may possibly be considered to amount to 
                                                           
42   For a further analysis of the application of s s14(2)(b) and 14(3) of the Equality Act, see Kok 
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unfair discrimination.
43 The second practice listed in Item 5 is of particular relevance 
inter  alia  for  gender  discrimination  as  it  prohibits  "unfair  discrimination  in  the 
provision of benefits, facilities and services related to insurance ". It identifies this 
type of discriminatory insurance practice, specifically the placing of an advantage or 
disadvantage to persons based inter alia on gender as being possibly unfair. Should 
a South African Court find that the practice of charging higher premiums for males  
and for younger drivers is unfair under this Item, insurers would  not be allowed to 
discriminate based on age and gender.  
 
In considering the approach a South African Court could take, it appears that the 
outcome, as with the American judgments and with  the Canadian judgments of 
Zurich and Co-operators, would either be to find that the use of gender as a rating 
variable amounts to unfair discrimination or to disregard the right to equality in 
order to prevent the negative financial effect that  such a finding would have on 
women.  Regardless of what a South African Court would decide, both possible 
outcomes have undesirable consequences. If it is decided that the use of gender as 
a motor-vehicle insurance rating variable amounts to unfair discrimination, wom en 
would have to pay elevated motor -vehicle insurance premiums. If a Court decides 
that the financial impact on women is too substantial , it would continue to allow 
discrimination based on gender. 
 
A  number of further questions arise:   Is there not a midway   point  between  the 
extremes of disregarding the right to equality and the consequence of women 
subsidising men? Why can insurers not rather adopt a reformed approach to risk 
assessment? Would a South African Court not be more inclined to remove age and 
gender discrimination if there were no significant consequences for women? Could a 
balance be achieved  between disregarding discriminatory rating variables and not 
penalising  women  for  their  removal ?  The  answers  appear  to  lie  in  the  test 
formulated in Meiorin. 
 
                                                           
43   See also Albertyn, Goldblatt and Roederer Promotion of Equality 115.  
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5  Recommendations for a South African Court  
 
This  article  suggests  that  a  balance  between  disregarding  discriminatory  rating 
variables and not penalising women for their removal can be found. An approach 
that achieves such a balance could be termed a "reformed approach". It is submitted 
that a test similar to the Meiorin test might support such a reformed approach. The 
Meiorin  test  requires the  insurer  to  accommodate  the  insurer  up  to  the  point  of 
undue hardship through seeking practical alternatives. This approach would require 
a South African insurer to accommodate the insured by seeking practical alternatives 
up to the point of undue hardship when classifying the risk posed by the insured.  
 
This reformed approach would prescribe that the insurer is to take extensive steps 
when classifying the insured. It is not unique for extreme steps to be required to be 
taken to accommodate consumers. In terms of section 81(2) of the National Credit 
Act,
44 for instance, an extensive enquiry related to a consumer’s finances is required 
before  credit  is  granted.  This  enquiry  is  accommodated  by  banks  and  similar 
institutions, despite the additional costs involved. There does not appear to be any 
reason why a similar process, which requires the insurer to take further steps to 
assess  the  risk  posed  by  the  individual  insured,  cannot  be  expected  from  an 
insurance company. 
 
Thus,  rather  than  using  gender  as  a  rating  variable  the  insurer  can  individually 
assess the insured (at least up to the point before undue hardship) with the use of 
appropriate, neutral rating variables suited to the particular circumstances of the 
insured. This would require a much more intensive and individual risk evaluation and 
would require the insurer to "tailor-make" insurance for each individual insured. For 
example, the insurer could require the insured to take an advanced driving test to 
determine  his  or  her  level  of  skill  as  a  driver.  This  test  could  be  ongoing,  to 
continually assess the insured’s skills and to afford the insured, especially the newly 
licensed, the opportunity to lower his or her premiums through improved driving 
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skills. Another example of individual risk assessment is for the insurer to keep record 
of all the insured’s traffic fines, thus continually assessing the road usage of the 
insured and being able to adjust the premiums accordingly. 
 
The intensive and accurate classification of each insured would result in the insured 
truly paying premiums in accordance with the individual risk that he or she poses, 
without the use of age or gender as immutable rating variables or any form of a 
blanket approach to risk assessment.  
 
At most, this reformed approach to insurance risk assessment would result in an 
inconvenience and increased cost to the insurer. In the case of Grismer a reasonably 
elevated  cost  might  be  considered  as  fair.  However,  the  right  to  equality  most 
certainly outweighs the inconvenience suffered by the insurer and it would  quite 
possibly  be  viable  for  the  insurance  industry  to  absorb  such  an  additional  cost, 
especially  when  considering  the  size  of  the  industry  and  increasing  technological 
advances, which could reduce the cost and inconvenience involved. For example, 
"tailor-made" online risk assessment would reduce consultation and administrative 
costs. An insured may also need to be re-evaluated on a more regular basis, and 
online risk assessment could facilitate this process. 
 
Very importantly, this reformed approach to insurance-risk assessment would not 
result in women having to subsidise men and would also be suited to the economic 
model of insurance, as the insured would have to pay in proportion to the cost of the 
product. If the insured is paying a higher premium, he or she has only his or her 
own self to hold accountable, as it would be the result of his or her own conduct. 
 
Further, this reformed approach is not limited to the issue of intensive and fair risk 
assessment. It could also result in other related benefits. It could encourage better 
road usage in order to prevent loaded premiums and possibly encourage road users 
to take advanced driving courses in order to reduce their premiums. Insureds would 
feel individually responsible for the amount of their premium, and this could result in 
their improving their driving skills. For example, regardless of gender or  age, an AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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individual who often causes accidents, has numerous speeding fines and drives at 
high-risk  times  such  as  late  at  night  over  weekends,  would  pay  an  increased 
premium in comparison to an individual regardless of gender who has never been 
the cause of an accident, has attended an advanced driving course, has no speeding 
fines  and  generally  drives  at  low-risk  times.  However,  the  high-risk  driver  could 
eventually lower his premiums if he or she attended a driving course, drives within 
speed limits and remains accident-free for a reasonable period of time. Like building 
up a "credit record", the insured driver has the opportunity to build up a favourable 
"insurance driving record". 
 
It is proposed that no fixed set of variables be used, as not all would be appropriate 
for each circumstance. For example, it would be inappropriate to use the "number of 
years licensed" for a young driver with only a few years of driving experience. An 
insurer could rather, for example, enquire as to the young insured’s intended use of 
the  vehicle,  average  mileage  and  social  habits  and  require  the  young  driver  to 
complete an advanced driving test.  
 
This reformed approach may, however, be disadvantageous in certain respects. If 
insurers  require  the  insured  to  absorb  the  additional  cost  of  individualized  risk 
assessment, this may cause there to be more uninsured drivers on the road, given 
that motor-vehicle insurance is not (at present) compulsory. It may also discourage 
high-risk drivers from being insured due to their premiums being loaded. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
As  the  Equality  Act  identifies  that  the  discriminatory  insurance  practice  of 
disadvantaging or advantaging persons based inter alia on their gender may possibly 
be unfair, South African insurers will have to consider more neutral methods of risk 
assessment.  Insurers  rely  on  accurate  risk  assessment  methods  to  determine 
accurate  premiums,  and  insureds,  in  turn,  have  the  right  not  to  be  unfairly 
discriminated  against.  Therefore  this  article  suggests  a  reformed  approach  which 
breaks away from the traditional discriminatory risk assessment practices without AN WAGENER    2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
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the  undesirable  consequences  of  women  subsidizing  men  or  the  continuation  of 
discriminatory risk assessment based on gender. It is possibly just a matter of time 
before such a matter is heard by a South African Court, and it is hoped that the 
Courts will consider more neutral options than handing down a decision that has 
undesirable consequences. 
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